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Introduction
Geach is best known for his contributions to theoretical philosophy:  Most of  his more than
one  hundred  papers  and  a  dozen  books  are  on  logic,  philosophy  of  language  and
metaphysics.  But he also made significant contributions to ethics.  Particularly influential
were a series of  short metaethics papers, which are small masterpieces, both in terms of
philosophical content and style.  In usually less than ten pages, Geach delivers sharp analyses
and powerful objections against influential schools.  His arguments are always so clear and
his  examples so simple  that  they leave the  reader wondering why no one before Geach
detected the problems he points out.
Short Biography
Peter  Thomas Geach was  born  on March 29,  1916,  in  London.   His  parents  separated
shortly after his birth.  Until he was four, Geach grew up with his mother’s parents, who
were Polish immigrants.   During this  time,  his  father taught philosophy for the colonial
administration in India.  He had been educated by McTaggart, Russell and Moore.  After his
father  secured a court  order,  Geach junior  moved to a paternal  relative and finally  to a
boarding school.  Since the age of  four, he had no more contact with his maternal family,
and he had to relearn Polish again as an adult.
In 1938, Geach completed a BA at Oxford, with a stipend from Balliol College.  During the
same year, he met Elizabeth Anscombe.  They married in 1941 and had seven children.
Geach spent most of  his career at the Universities of  Birmingham and Leeds, where he was
appointed  to  the  logic  chair  in  1966,  but  he  often  traveled  for  international  visiting
appointments and lecture series.  Geach died on December 21, 2013, in Cambridge.
The earliest philosophical influence on Geach was his father.  When Geach was eight, the
father  retired early  and moved back to the UK.  He provided the  young Geach with a
systematic education in logic.  The son describes him as “a very strange man.”  Thus, Geach
senior  changed  his  religion  “about  three  times  a  year,”  and  he  “always  had  persuasive
arguments in favour of  his latest belief, which he would bring out for his son’s benefit,” who
“for some time followed my father through his various phases of  faith” (Geach in Lewis
1989, 2).  Geach senior was horrified at the contradictory conception of  divine omnipotence
that the son had been taught in his absence.  As a cure, he prescribed McTaggart’s  Some
Dogmas of  Religion.  “The remedy was entirely successful; I felt towards McTaggart thereafter
as  Lucretius  did  towards  Epicurus;  he  had  delivered  me  from  a  mentally  crippling
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superstition, and I could now think like a free man.” (Geach 2001, 4-5).   Decades  later,
McTaggart’s work was temporarily forgotten, but for Geach it remained a life-long point of
reference (see, e.g.,  Geach 2002,  191-193).  In 1979, Geach published an introduction into
McTaggart’s Philosophy.
In the late 1940s, Geach spent a lot of  time in Cambridge, where he met Wittgenstein and
von Wright.  With the former he often took walks.  His experience of  these was similar to
that  of  the  young  Wittgenstein  with  Frege:   “[A]ttempts  at  light  conversation  were
immediately quashed,  and careless talk about philosophy was ruthlessly and devastatingly
exposed” (Geach in Lewis 1989, 13). Geach’s first book,  Mental Acts (1957), was strongly
influenced by Wittgenstein.  A methodological maxim to which Geach repeatedly alludes
throughout his work is formulated in PI § 593:  “A major cause of  philosophical diseases—a
one-sided diet:  One nourishes one’s thinking with only one type of  example.”  Geach often
combines this maxim with the idea that “the logician’s role in philosophy” is that of  an
“accountant,”  particularly  in  moral  philosophy,  since  “[m]any  moral  philosophers  have
invested a lot of  their intellectual capital in the unsound, watered stock of  dubious semiotic
theories” (Geach 1977a, 7).
The two most profound influences on Geach’s thought, however, were probably Anscombe,
with  whom he also  co-authored  (e.g.  a  translation  of  Descartes’  major  works),  and the
Catholic  faith,  to  which  both  had  converted  independently  of  each  other  during  their
studies.  Many of  Geach’s writings discuss metaphysical and logical questions of  Catholic
theology.  Geach’s moral philosophy, too, is strongly influenced by Catholicism.  This holds
for his theory of  the virtues (see below), as well as for his views on questions in applied
ethics (such as contraception).
The Grammar of Moral Expressions such as “Good” or
“Should”
Geach’s perhaps most famous paper, “Good and Evil” (1956), is representative of  his style
and many of  his skills.  He proceeds from a completely uncontroversial, grammatical insight
—here  the  distinction  between  “attributive”  and  “predicative”  adjectives,  introduced  by
linguists.  He then spells out wide-ranging conclusions for ethics, in less than ten pages.  In
“Good and Evil,” the argument leads him to reject two major schools of  metaethics, non-
natural realism and expressivism.
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An attributive adjective precedes a noun; Geach’s example is: “a red  book.”  A predicative
adjective follows a verb such as “to be,” “to stay” or “to become,” e.g.: “This book is red.”
While  “red” can be used in both these  ways,  some adjectives  (logically)  only  permit  an
attributive use—Geach discusses the examples “small,” “forged” and “putative.”  Surface
grammar  admittedly  suggests  the  opposite,  since  we  often  formulate  sentences  such as:
“Peter Geach was small.”  This sentence, however, contains an implicit reference to a noun:
Peter Geach was a small human being.
This shows in the fact that such sentences cannot be split.  The sentence “X is a small flea,”
e.g., cannot be split into “X is a flea” and “X is small,” which would be no problem with the
sentence “X is a red car.”  In order to use an attributive adjective, “some substantive has to
be understood” (34).  For the adjective is used in reference to a kind of  object and thus to
the kind’s specific norms.
Geach’s philosophical thesis is that the adjectives “good” and “evil” are (logically) attributive.
“[T]here is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-
and-so” (34).  Thus, the sentence “X is a good car” cannot be split into “X is good” and “X
is a car.”  And if  we say that Peter Geach was good, we either mean that he was a good
philosopher or a good teacher or a good person, depending on context.  “Good” always
requires a reference (at least implicitly) to an object that provides an object-specific norm.
Consequently, “good” can denote a variety of  very different properties.  While a good car
might be a fast car,  a good teacher might be characterized by patience.   This important
observation is shared by two important groups of  metaethicists: non-natural realists (whom
Geach calls “objectivists”) and expressivists/non-cognitivists (whom Geach calls “Oxford
Moralists”).  According to Geach, however, both schools draws entirely false conclusions
from the fact that “good” can denote widely different properties.
Non-natural realists (Geach probably thinks of  Moore here) regard these many different
uses of  “good” as an imprecision of  ordinary language.  According to this theory, there is a
single property of  goodness,  which all  good objects share and which only philosophical
analysis can uncover.  Geach, however, has just demonstrated that all attributive adjectives
show such variety.  But who would conclude from this that, e.g., all small objects share that
same primitive property of  smallness?
Expressivists (Geach mainly targets Hare) regard these very different uses of  “good” as an
indication  that  the  respective  sentences  aren’t  assertions  but  rather  recommendations:
“‘That  is  a  good book’  means  something like  ‘I  recommend that  book’  or  ‘choose that
book’” (36).  According to this theory, the goodness of  cars differs from the goodness of
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teachers because we value and recommend speed in cars but patience in teachers.  Geach
points out that we hardly commend a person by calling them, e.g., a good burglar.  More
important, however, is that the above argument also applies here:  Adjectives such as “small”
show the same variety, but nobody concludes from this that sentences such as “This is a
small car” aren’t assertions.
Apart from these objections to other schools, “Good and Evil”  also makes a significant
positive contribution:  In using an attributive adjective, we apply the norm of  the respective
kind of  object.  If  we say, e.g., that Bess is a good burglar, then we use the norm of  burgling:
Bess is perhaps exceptionally quiet, unscrupulous and quick.  This means that kinds such as
human being or action also possess a norm, to which we allude when we say that Bess is an evil
human being or that her actions are bad actions.
This thesis, of  course, is not new; it forms the core of  Aristotelian naturalism, and Geach
does  not  further  elaborate  it  in  “Good and Evil.”   But  he  provides  a  completely  new
argument for this thesis, viz. that “good” is an attributive, not a predicative adjective, and
that its use hence requires a norm that has to be provided by the object in question.
What Geach demonstrates in “Good and Evil” for these two adjectives applies in a similar
form for many moral expressions.1  In “Whatever Happened to Deontic Logic?” (1982b),
Geach argues that, after von Wright’s seminal work “Deontic Logic” (Mind 1951), most of
the  research  in  this  field  took  a  wrong  turn,  which  now  constantly  generates  pseudo-
problems.  In his original formalism, von Wright applies deontic operators such as “ought,”
“may,” “is obligatory” or “is permissible” to kinds of  actions, such as “It is permissible to
get married”  or “It is obligatory to honour parents” (1).  Later, he and many other authors
apply theses operators only to facts or situations, such as “It ought to be the case that:  A
invites  B for  lunch.”   Ever  since  this  reinterpretation,  paradoxes  can  be  generated
systematically.   In  our  lunch  example,  the  situation  that  ought  to  be  realized  seems  to
necessitate two actions:  The active invitation by A and the passive allowing-themselves-to-
be invited by B.  Now it might be that one of  these actions ought to be carried out, whereas
the other ought not.  Perhaps A has often been invited by B and ought to reciprocate one of
these days.  That doesn’t entail, however, that B ought to accept A’s invitation.  (B might be
much richer than A, e.g., and then it could be inappropriate for B to have his lunch paid for
by A.)
1 I am grateful to Dr. Ulf  Hlobil for pointing out the parallel discussed in this paragraph
to  me.   He  also  alerted  me  to  the  fact  that  Kit  Fine’s  “Essence  and  Modality”
(Philosophical  Perspectives  1994)  introduces  a  thesis  for  alethic  modality  that  is  largely
analogous to Geach’s claim about deontic expressions.
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Geach described the source of  such paradoxes as follows: “[O]bligation essentially relates //
to an agent, it is somebody’s obligation; if  instead we try to think of  the ought-to-be-ness, Sein-
sollen, of  a situation involving the agent, then our thinking is going to be confused” (2-3, emph.
orig.), because our most fine-grained distinction will be between situations, and that causes
the above problem.  Just as “good” refers to something that offers a measure of  evaluation
(often the nature of  the evaluated object),  deontic  expressions such as “ought” refer to
something for which there is a duty or a permission (often the agent).
The Frege-Geach Problem
Geach’s  papers  “Ascriptivism”  (1960)  and  “Assertion”  (1965)  prompted  a  wave  of
expressivist responses that still continue fifty years later (see bibliography).  Geach’s thesis,
however, initially appears so trivial, that he cautiously introduces it as follows:  “This may
appear so obviously true as to hardly be worth saying.” (Geach 1965, 449)
Geach’s  apparently  trivial  thesis  is  this:   “[A]  proposition  may  occur  in  discourse  now
asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition” (449).  In other
words, a certain content can be asserted by the speaker or be neutrally reported, without this
changing the content itself.  Neutral reports embed the proposition, e.g. in a conditional or a
question.  Whereas the sentence “Smith is the murderer!” (462) makes a normative claim
about Smith, “If  Smith is the murderer, then ...” or “Is Smith the murderer?” report the
same proposition in a neutral way.  The proposition, however, is the same in all cases, viz.
‘Smith is the murderer’.
Geach  credits  Frege,  in  the  early  work  Begriffsschrift,2 with  this  discovery.   There,  Frege
distinguishes between content  (Inhalt) and assertive force  (behauptender  Kraft),  and he even
introduces a sign for the latter, the assertion stroke.  Geach calls this distinction the “Frege
point”  (449).   Today,  the  name  “Frege-Geach  Problem”  is  more  common.   Frege’s
distinction only constitutes a problem, of  course, if  irreconcilable with one’s theory.
As it turns out, the distinction is irreconcilable with a whole family of  theories, which we
could call “anti-descriptivist” (Geach 1960, 222; 1965, 461).  Geach criticizes several theories
in philosophy of  language here, such as Austin’s speech-act theory (How to Do Things with
Words, 1962) and Strawson’s theory of  predicates (Individuals, 1959).  The most significant
2 See §§ 2–4.  More explicit references are to be found in the introductions of  Frege’s
various unfinished attempts to provide an overview of  his work, such as Kurze Übersicht
meiner logischen Lehren, Einleitung in die Logik and Meine grundlegenden logischen Einsichten.
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impact of  Geach’s critique, however, was in ethics.  Geach’s insight seemed to contradict the
central tenet of  expressivism/non-cognitivism.
Expressivists  hold  that  moral  utterances  cannot  have  descriptive  content;  therefore,
utterances such as “What Smith did was wrong” aren’t assertions.  What they are instead is a
matter of  debate:  Ayer (Language,  Truth and Logic,  1936), e.g.,  takes them to be a public
pronouncement  of  the  speaker’s  feelings;  for  Hare  (The  Language  of  Morals,  1952),  they
resemble imperatives.  All agree, however, that moral utterances have as little content as the
spontaneous exclamations “Boo!” or “Stop it!” in Smith’s direction.  (One consequence of
this is that moral utterances can neither be true nor false.)
Against this, Geach (1960, 224; 1965, 461 seqq.)  points out that moral utterances can be
embedded.  Sentences such as “If  what Smith did was wrong, then he will receive a prison
sentence,” “Either what Smith did was wrong or the file is incomplete” or “Was it wrong
what Smith did?” are grammatically correct and meaningful.  Expressivists, however, cannot
explain what such sentences mean.  If  the embedded utterance stands by itself, expressivists
explain  its  meaning  as  a  speech  act,  but  speech  acts  cannot  be  embedded.   Therefore,
expressivists  cannot  explain  the  meaning  of  sentences  in  which  moral  utterances  are
embedded.
The most obvious response for expressivists would be to say that the embedded and the
independent utterance have different meanings.  This leads Geach to the second step of  his
argument:  If  Frege is correct, then we always use the same proposition, no matter whether
we assert or embed it.   That Frege is correct, however, seems almost trivial,  as noted in
Geach’s  introduction.   We  can  furthermore  easily  give  examples  of  inferences  which
expressivists,  too,  would  regard  as  valid,  but  which  would  be  invalid  if  the  suggested
difference in meaning existed.  Take the following modus ponens:
1. If  what Smith did was wrong, then he will receive a prison sentence.
2. What Smith did was wrong.
3. Therefore, Smith will receive a prison sentence.
The antecedent “If  what Smith did was wrong” in line 1 and the independent “What Smith
did was wrong” in line 2 must have the same proposition as their content, viz. ‘What Smith
did was wrong’.  If  they expressed different propositions or if  line 2 had no content (but
were, e.g., a refined way of  shouting “Boo!”), then this inference would be invalid—which it
clearly is not.
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Today, there is a vast and highly specialized literature on the Frege-Geach problem.  Geach’s
original  targets—mostly  emotivism  and  prescriptivism—have  been  modified  in  all
conceivable ways in order to circumvent the problem.  Prominent alternatives are Gibbard’s
idea of  hyperplans or Blackburn’s quasi-realism.  (Most contemporary literature belongs to
formal semantics rather than ethics.)  This second generation of  expressivists agrees with
Geach’s diagnosis, and they attempt to develop a variant of  expressivism that allows that
moral utterances have content.
Many of  the new variants of  expressivism have prompted new versions of  the Frege-Geach
problem.  Contemporary expressivists  usually  assume that  linguistic  utterances owe their
meaning to their role in expressing mental states (a view that Geach would have vehemently
rejected).  Therefore, contemporary literature often formulates the Frege-Geach problem as
follows:  According to expressivism, the mental states expressed in assertions have to differ
systematically from the mental states expressed in moral utterances, but no such difference is
visible in our language.   Moral  terms can be embedded just as  any other term, and the
semantic consequences are the same.
The Supposed “Naturalistic Fallacy”
In the 1960s, more and more philosophers began to question the idea of  a “naturalistic
fallacy.”3  This thesis, originally introduced by Hume,4 says that it is in principle impossible to
infer a judgment about what should be the case from a judgment about what is the case.
Hence many moral philosophers held that moral conclusions cannot be inferred from mere
facts.  In 1976, Geach published two short, much discussed papers on this topic, “Murder
and Sodomy” and “Morally Significant Theses.”  Both provide examples of  obviously valid
inferences of  moral conclusions from mere statements of  fact.
One type of  example that Geach discusses has the following structure (see 1976a, 346):  A
believes  that  a  pickpocket  should  be  imprisoned,  but  she  wants  to  let  someone  who
manipulated the prime rate get away with a fine.  B argues against this as follows:  Large-scale
market manipulations are a more severe crime than petty theft.  More severe crimes have to
be punished at least as harshly as less severe crimes.  Imprisonment is harsher than a fine.
Therefore,  people  who  manipulate  the  prime  rate  should  be  imprisoned  if  pickpockets
3 Important  papers  are Anscombe’s  early  “On Brute Facts”  (Analysis 1958),  as  well  as
Searle’s more often-cited “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’” (Philosophical Review 1964).
4 See his Treatise  on Human Nature,  3.1.1, §9. (The expression “naturalistic fallacy” is by
G. E. Moore.)
Pre-print (corrected); July 1, 2018
Katharina Nieswandt, Peter Geach's Ethics 9 of  15
should be imprisoned.  Now,  A and  B seem to have a real  moral  dispute here,  and  B’s
conclusion hence seems to have moral content.  According to the doctrine of  the naturalistic
fallacy, it should therefore be impossible to infer  B’s conclusion from pure statements of
fact.  Geach points out that that is false:  B’s conclusion can be inferred, for instance, from
the premise that everyone who manipulates the prime rate is a pickpocket.  That premise
might be false, but that doesn’t invalidate the inference.  More importantly, it is a premise
about pure facts:  It says that all elements of  the set “manipulators of  the prime rate” are
also  elements  of  the  set  “pickpockets.”   If  we  concede  that  B’s  conclusion  has  moral
content, then we also have to concede that moral judgments can be inferred from judgments
of  fact.
According to Geach, the possibility of  such inferences “ought not to surprise anyone: the
difference between the factual and the evaluative, or the moral and the non-moral, never did
look like the sort of  difference of  which logic ought to take account, any more than there is
a special logic of  rudeness or obscenity” (1976a, 347).
Natural Teleology
It has often been claimed that teleological explanations are obsolete, especially in biology:
Any  teleological  explanation  can  supposedly  be  substituted  for  an  efficient  causal
explanation, which furthermore is the real (usually meaning: the scientific) explanation of
the phenomenon.  According to this view, teleological explanations are at best a convenience
of  ordinary language, but often they constitute misleading anthropomorphizations.  In two
papers,  “Teleological  Explanation”  (1975a)  and  “Contingency,  Cause  and  End”  (2002),
Geach defends  the  opposite  view:   Efficient  causal  explanations  presuppose  teleological
concepts.
When we speak of  general laws of  nature, e.g., we actually describe tendencies, Geach says.
This has been noted by others before; Geach (2002, 195) himself  uses an example from
Mills’ Logic (III.10, §5):  If  force is exerted on a body, then that body has a tendency to move
in the direction opposite the force, and we can formulate a corresponding general law of
motion.  This law, however, only describes a tendency because other forces—gravity, e.g., but
also further events—might work in the opposite direction of  the body’s movement.  The
concept ‘tendency’, however, is a teleological concept, Geach (1975a, 93) claims.  Instances
of  teleological vocabulary in biology are even more obvious, e.g. when authors say “that
‘evolution’ would not have ‘allowed’ the [pineal gland][...]  to survive if  it  and its internal
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secretion  were  now  useless”  (2002,  197),  or  consider  “catchpenny  titles  as  ‘the  blind
watchmaker’ and ‘the selfish gene’” (198, emph. orig.).5
Those who oppose teleological explanation often try to eliminate the concept of  a tendency
through a counterfactual analysis of  opposing efficient causes.  Geach regards this idea as
incoherent: “For what actually happens cannot be the resultant of  a lot of  things that would
happen if  only there were not other things that would happen if  only there were not yet
other things (or perhaps the first-mentioned things) that would happen if....” (195).  If, e.g.,
something would raise a body’s temperature by 25°C, while something else would reduce it
by 10°C, so that said body under their joint influence ends up 15°C warmer than before,
then we cannot regard its temperature as the result of  two opposing causal processes, a
warming by 25°C and a cooling by 10°C, since both these events never happened (193-4).
The teleological content of  efficient causal explanations also shows in their logical structure,
according to Geach.  He points out that efficient causal inferences are non-monotonic; i.e.,
their validity can be changed by adding further premises (1975a, 90; 2002, 199-200).  The
same  is  true  of  practical  inferences.   Geach  therefore  thinks  that  a  logic  of  natural
tendencies would best be modeled on a logic of  imperatives (an idea, which he never carried
out).
One reason for the wide-spread rejection of  teleological explanations, Geach thinks, is the
mistaken assumption that such explanations imply further ends (1975a, 85-7).  Many natural
processes, however, are cyclical, and the cycle itself  often has no further function: “If  mayfly
grubs  hatch  in  order  to  develop into  mayflies,  and  mayflies—which have  no means  of
eating, only enough stored energy to reproduce—live in order to produce eggs that are to
hatch into mayfly grubs—what then, it may be asked, is the whole process in aid of?  Isn’t it
futile, like the labours of  Sisyphos?  The difficulty arises only because we tacitly suppose we
have to look for an end after all the generations of  mayflies” (87, emph. orig.).
The Role of the Virtues in Moral Life
As early as the 1970s, Geach already attempted to give a comprehensive account of  the
individual virtues and their functions (Geach 1977a; Geach 2001 further develops some of
these themes).  He gave a series of  lectures, the first of  which, “Why Men Need the Virtues”
(1977a, 1-18), sketches a theoretical framework that many future Aristotelian naturalists took
5 Both books are by British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and are explicitly anti-
teleological.
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over and expanded.  Geach argues here that  natural  teleology and contemporary natural
science are compatible; he defends Aristotle’s idea of  a human function, and he argues that
the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, temperance and courage) are necessary to perform
that function—at least on any halfway plausible conception of  it.
There  are  a  number  of  different  ways  to  spell  out  the  human  function and hence  the
function  of  the  cardinal  virtues.   Geach  himself  explicitly  proceeds  from  a  Christian
premise:   The  ultimate  function  of  all  individual  virtues  is  to  enable  human beings  to
overcome original sin (168).  Despite its influence on Aristotelian naturalism, Geach’s own
theory does hence not belong to this family of  theories:  Geach proposes a religious virtue
ethics.
Even though many later authors rejected Geach’s Christian framework, his lecture series had
an enormous influence.  Thus, Geach defends the thesis that a character trait can only be
called a “virtue” if  employed in the service of  good deeds (157, 167),  and he discusses
interesting objections against the idea of  a necessary unity of  the virtues (161-7) or against
consequentialism (90-103).  Especially his examples have been perceived as helpful and have
been developed further by others:   Thus, Geach already argues that life-form judgments
cannot be statistical judgments, by pointing out that it is correct to say that the function of
acorns is to grow into oaks, even though only a tiny minority of  all acorns effectively does
(21).  And he points out that the virtues do not necessarily contribute to the well-being of
their possessor:  “Men need virtues as bees need stings.  […] [A]n individual man may perish
by being brave or just, all the same men need courage and justice.” (17)
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1977b: Again the Logic of  “Ought.”  Philosophy 52 (202), 473–476.
A reply to critiques of  Geach 1976a and b (see “Secondary Literature”).
1979: Some Hobbesian Theses about Justice.  Dialectics and Humanism 6 (4), 45–50.
Geach’s political  views were deeply influenced by Hobbes.  Here,  he defends Hobbes’  view of
justice within a state.
1982a: Moral Autonomy Still Refuted.  Philosophy 57 (219), 127–129.
A further reply to critiques of  Geach 1976a and b.  (“Autonomy” here refers to the autonomy
of  ethics alleged by Hare and others, i.e., the impossibility of  inferring ethical from non-ethical
judgments.)
1982b: Whatever Happened to Deontic Logic?  Philosophia 11 (1), 1–12.
Reprinted  in:  Peter  Geach  & Jacek  Hołowka  (eds.):   Logic  and  Ethics. (Nijhoff
International Philosophy Series 41).  Dordrecht 1991:  Springer,  33–48.
2001: Truth and Hope (The Fürst Franz-Josef  and Fürstin Gina Lectures 1998).  Notre
Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame UP.
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Develops some earlier themes of  Geach’s work, mostly his theory of  truth, but in chapters 4 and
5, Geach returns to his views on lying and promising introduced in Geach 1977a, chapter 6.
2002: “Contingency, Cause, and End.” In: Die Normativität des Wirklichen, ed. by Thomas
Buchheim, Rolf  Schönberger & Walter Schweidler. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Secondary Literature on Geach’s Moral Philosophy (Selection)
Hare, Richard (1957). Geach: Good and Evil. Analysis, 17 (5), 103–111.
Searle, John (1962):  Meaning and Speech Acts.  The Philosophical Review 71 (4), 423–432.
Part I treats the same problem as Geach 1960 and 1965.  Searle gives examples in which “good” is
embedded,  and  he  shows  that  the  meaning  of  “good”  in  these  cases  cannot  be  that  the  speaker
recommends something.
Winch, Peter (1975):  Comment: Geach on Teleological Explanation.  In: Explanation: Papers
and Discussions, ed. by Peter Achinstein & Stephen Körner.  New Haven:  Yale UP, 95–
105.
Henry,  Grete  (1975):   Comment.   In:  Explanation:  Papers  and  Discussions,  ed.  by  Peter
Achinstein & Stephen Körner.  New Haven:  Yale UP, 105–112.
Hare, Richard (1977):  Geach on Murder and Sodomy.  Philosophy 52 (202), 467–472.
A reply to Geach’s counterexamples against the supposed naturalistic fallacy in Geach 1976a and b.
Geach 1977b is a brief  rejection of  this and the following paper:
Borowski, E. J. (1977):  A Pyrrhic Defence of  Moral Autonomy.  Philosophy 52 (202), 455–
466.
Borowski, E. J. (1980):  Moral Autonomy Fights Back.  Philosophy 55 (211), 95–100.
A reply to Geach 1977b.  Geach 1982a is a brief  rejection of  this and the following paper:
Hurka, Thomas (1980):  Geach on Deriving Categorical “Oughts.”  Philosophy 55 (211), 101–
104.
Karmo,  Toomas  (1988):   Some  Valid  (but  not  Sound)  Arguments  Trivially  Span  the
“Is”-“Ought” Gap.  Mind 97 (386), 252–257.
Attempts to circumvent the problems raised in Geach 1976a and b through a model on which the
same judgments count as moral judgments in some possible worlds but not in others.
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MacIntyre, Alastair (2002). Virtues in Foot and Geach. Philosophical Quarterly, 52 (209), 621–
631.
Compares  the  theory  of  the  virtues  in  Geach  2001  with  that  of  Philippa  Foot  in  Natural
Goodness (Oxford UP 2001).
Haldane, John (2002).  “Truth and Hope, by Peter Geach.”  Journal of  Philosophy 99 (3), 157–
162.
A critical overview of  the main theses in Geach 2001.
Schroeder, Mark (2008):  What is the Frege-Geach Problem?  Philosophy Compass 3 (4), 703–
720.
A contemporary, accessible overview of  the original formulations of  the problem by Geach and Searle
and of  the ensuing debates, solely treating ethics.
Thomson,  Judith  Jarvis  (2008):   Normativity  (The  Paul  Carus  Lectures  2003).   Peru,  Ill.:
Open Court.
Chapters 1 and 2 elaborate the main theses from Geach 1956.
Schroeder, Mark (2011):  Ought, Agents, and Actions.  Philosophical Review 120 (1), 1–41.
Defends  the  thesis  developed  in  Geach  1982b  that  “ought”  does  not  (always)  refer  to  facts  or
situations.
Charlow, Nate (2014):  The Problem with the Frege-Geach Problem.  Philosophical Studies 167
(3), 635–665.
A contemporary stock-check of  which expressivist theories are refuted by which version of  the Frege-
Geach problem (as well as a new suggestion for a variant of  expressivism designed to circumvent it).
Rowland, Richard (2016):   In Defence of  Good Simpliciter.   Philosophical  Studies 173 (5),
1371–1391.
A contemporary attempt to reject Geach 1956 as well as later elaborations (e.g., by J. J. Thomson or
Foot).
About Peter Geach
Lewis, Harry (Ed.) (1991).  Peter Geach: Philosophical Encounters.  Essays by Peter Geach and
Others.  Dordrecht: Kluwer/Springer.
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A Festschrift of  330 pages, which also contains a highly readable “Philosophical Autobiography” (1–
25), as well as a bibliography of  Geach’s works up till 1989 (307–315).  The bibliography can be
accessed here:  link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm:978-94-015-7885-1/1.pdf.
The book is divided into three topics, “History of  Philosophy,” “Logic and Identity” and “Philosophy
of  Religion.”   Each begins with a short introduction by Geach, followed by papers by colleagues—
among them Quine, Anscombe and Müller.  In the last section, Geach replies to these papers.
Haldane,  John (2016):   Anscombe and Geach on Mind and the Soul.   American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly 90 (16), 369–394.
Investigates Geach’s and Anscombe’s early philosophical works as well as how they influenced each
other.
Several obituaries appeared after Geach’s death.  The following two are especially recommended:
O’Grady, Jane:  Peter Geach obituary.  The Guardian, December 26, 2013 (revised December
27):  https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/dec/26/peter-geach.
[No author]:  Emeritus Professor Peter T. Geach.  The University of  Leeds, Obituaries 2014.
https://www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/obituaries/2014/geach_peter.html.
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